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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the case.

This case involves the denial of two (2) dock permit applications submitted to the Idaho
Department of Lands (State appellants collectively "IDL") by the Plaintiffs-Respondents Peter
and Shelagh Kaseburg and the Kaseburg Family Trust ("Applicants") pursuant to the Lake
Protection Act, Idaho Code title 58, chapter 13 ("LP A"). The Applicants own property adjacent
to Lake Pend Oreille on Glengary Bay.
The Applicants filed an application (the "219B application") for a lake encroachment
permit to replace 21 existing wood pilings! with ten (10) steel pilings. The wood pilings extend
about 280 feet waterward of the artificial high water mark of Lake Pend Oreille. No purpose for
the new pilings was identified in the application. After an opportunity for public notice and
comments, IDL denied the application. A rehearing on the application was held, and the original
denial was affirmed by the hearing officer and the IDL Director.
While the 219B application was pending, the Applicants submitted a second application
(the "219C application"). The 219C application sought approval for removing unused wooden
pilings and installing a mobile dock system and mooring buoy anchorage using some of the
wood pilings. The mooring buoy and attached boat would have extended more than 250 feet
from the shoreline to allow the Applicants' wooden sailboat to remain in the water year round to
prevent cracking of the hull seams. After an opportunity for public notice and comment, IDL

! The State refers to the wood posts that are at issue in the instant appeal throughout this Brief as "pilings"
for convenience of discussion, although these posts do not meet the common dictionary defmition of "pilings," as
discussed more fully in the Section IILB. of the Argument, infra.
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denied the application.
Both permit denials were then appealed to District Court pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 675270 and Idaho Code § 58-1306(c). The denials were set aside by the District Court.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Applicants filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the denial of the 219B and 219C
applications on or about February 5, 2010. IDL filed the agency record for judicial review, after
which the parties briefed the case during 2010. Oral argument was held in October 2010.
The District Court issued its Decision on Appeal on November 19, 2010, setting aside
IDL's denial of the 219B and 219C applications, and remanding the matter for further
proceedings in accordance with the decision. An Amended Decision on Appeal was filed on
November 29, 2010, to correct the case number of the Decision on Appeal. Attorney fees and
costs were awarded to the Applicants.
The Applicants filed their Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. The State objected
to the attorney fees and costs, and moved for rehearing of the matter pursuant to LA.R. 42(b).
The District Court granted rehearing of the matter, and authorized additional briefing.
rehearing argument was held April 20, 2011.

A

The District Court issued its Decision on

Rehearing on May 11,2011, and granted IDL's request to vacate the award of attorney fees, but
upheld its previous decision in all other respects. The instant appeal followed.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Douglas McLean submitted a notice of an existing lake encroachment on December 29,
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1974, pursuant to what is now codified as Idaho Code § 58-1312.2 219B, Ex. 085-087. 3 The
existing encroachment consisted of fifteen (15) single and two (2) clusters of three (3) pilings
located in Glengary Bay on Lake Pend Oreille. The existing encroachment also included a
partially-buried water intake and a 7' X 30' cedar log dock near the shoreline. 219B, Ex. 087.
The lakeward end of the water intake was suspended from one wood pile. Id.; 219B, Ex. 096.
The purpose of the encroachments was identified as "private swimming & boat moorage area; &
private water source." 219B, Ex. 087. The pilings and dock were first installed in 1933, the
water pipeline in about 1941 or 1942. 219B, Ex. 085. The water intake is no longer in use.
219B, Ex. 122.
Lake Pend Oreille has an artificial high water mark due to the construction of the Albeni
Falls dam by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the early 1950's. See generally Swanson v.
United States, 600 F. Supp. 802, 804 (D. Idaho 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986)
(summarizing of the pre-and post-darn hydrology of Lake Pend Oreille). Before the dam, the
ordinary high water mark was at approximately 2051 feet above mean sea level, and after the
darn, approximately 2,062.5 feet above mean sea level. Id.
All of the pilings described in the McLean encroachment notice were installed before the
Albeni Falls darn was built and are located below the natural or ordinary high water mark of
Lake Pend Oreille. 219B, Ex. 033, 047, 066, 087. The McLean encroachments were given
identification number ERL-96-S-219. The permit was assigned to the Kaseburgs in 2008. 219B,
2 This statute was originally codified at Idaho Code § 58-153, and required that notice be filed identifying
all encroachments existing on or before December 31, 1974.
3 The Exhibits are numbered separately for each application, so the Exhibit numbers will be preceded by
the pertinent application record, 219B or 219C.
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Ex. 076-084.
On March 12,2009, Applicants submitted an application for a lake encroachment permit
to "replace (21 ea) existing wood pile with (10 ea) steel pile per attached drawing. Remove all
existing wood pile to ground level after steel pile are driven with diver using hydraulic powered
underwater chain saw." 219B, Ex. 001. 4 No navigational use, nor any specific use for the new
steel pile was identified. IDL processed the application as a non-navigational encroachment.
219B, Ex. 009-010,028-032,134 at ~ 7.
In response to the application, numerous comments were received in opposition to the
proposal from littoral owners in Glengary Bay, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and the
Bonner County Sheriff. Ex. 033-061. These commentors provided evidence that the pilings
were never used as an aid to navigation and, except for one piling used to support a water intake,
none of the pilings have been used for any purpose for about the last 70+ years 5 • Specific
objections to the applications by the parties included: (1) the existing pilings have been
abandoned for about 70 years; (2) the existing pilings have never had any function; (3) the
existing and replacement pilings constitute a navigational hazard; (4) the pilings in and of
themselves have no purpose and must be part of a larger dock proposal that, given the size,
would impact circulation and navigation in the small bay; and (6) the pilings negatively impacted
the aesthetics of the bay.
IDL denied the permit application for the reasons set forth by the objectors. 219B, Ex.
The full application packet is Ex. 001 through 008, and 025-027.
One resident stated that some portion of the pilings had been used in the 1930's to moor the living room
portion of a disassembled float home while the owner was building a home on the adjacent land. 219B, Ex. 059,
114.
4

5
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066. The Applicants requested reconsideration of the denial. 219B, Ex. 068. A reconsideration
hearing was held on August 17, 2009, at which the Applicant and his attorney appeared, as did
an objector, Mark Nelson. 219B, Ex. 089-131. The hearing officer prepared proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law and recommended denial of the subject permit application. 219B,
Ex. 132-144. The Director ofIDL issued a Final Order denying the 219B application. 219B, Ex.
145-147.
While the 219B application was pending, the Applicant submitted another application "to
remove unused wood pile to mud line. Cut off remaining pile to
attach mechanical clamping device for anchorage systems.

~

3 ft. above mud line and

Install mobile dock system and

mooring buoy anchorage." 219C, Ex. 001.
The purpose for the mobile dock system in the 219C application was to allow the
Applicants to adjust the mooring location as the water of the lake rises and falls so that his wood
sailboat can remain in water during the entire year. 219C, Ex. 012-014. IDL returned the 219C
application for lack of a processing fee for an encroachment beyond the line of navigability.
219C, Ex. 030. The Applicants then paid the application fee under protest. 219C, Ex. 031.
Notice of the 219C application was published and a number of objections to the proposed
mobile dock system were submitted to IDL. 219C, Ex. 038-049. The commentors objected to
the proposal because (1) the proposed dock would extend well beyond the 55 foot line of
navigability from the artificial high water mark, (2) the navigational hazard created by the
existence of submerged wood pilings cut 3 feet above the lake bed, and (3) the navigational
hazard created by the linderwater cables. Mr. Congleton, the Applicants' neighbor, also objected
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because the extension of the proposed encroachment more than 250 feet into Glengary Bay
during low water would create a navigational hazard for other property owners on the bay, and
preclude him from similar access to water during the low water time of year. 219C, Ex. 040042, 050-051.
IDL denied application 219C based upon the findings that the dock would extend into the
lake beyond the established line of navigability significantly further than existing docks in the
area, would create a navigational hazard in Glengary Bay, and would limit the future dock
potential for other littoral owners. Additionally, IDL found that the Applicants own extensive
shoreline and there are other possible locations for the dock that could serve their needs without
adversely impacting the neighbors. 219C, Ex. 050-051. IDL denied the Applicants' request for
reconsideration of the decision as not authorized by the statute. 219C, Ex. 053-056.
The Applicants appealed the matter to District Court, which set aside the IDL permit
denials and remanded the matter for further proceedings in accordance with its decision. R., p.
138-139 (Amended Decision on Appeal).

The District Court found that IDL erred when it

viewed the question of whether the subject pilings were navigational or nonnavigational as a
factual question rather than as a matter of law. R., p. 134-36. Instead, the District Court ruled
that IDL had no legal authority to reach a factual conclusion that the pilings were
nonnavigational encroachments, and that they were navigational as a matter of law based upon
its interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h). R., p. 136. The District Court remanded the
matter to IDL "to determine the line of navigability and to consider the Kaseburgs' littoral rights
in conjunction with the legislature's definition that the pilings at issue are 'encroachments in aid
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of navigation.'" Id. Finally, the District Court directed IDL to determine the line of navigability
in accordance with Idaho Code § S8-1302(g), and that "[t]he 'line of navigability' must be based
on access to the lake from the low watermark pursuant to the statute." R., p. 137.
IDL sought reconsideration of the District Court's decision. The District Court granted
reconsideration and vacated its earlier decision awarding attorney fees, but upheld its previous
decision as to the application denial. R., p. 194. The instant appeal followed.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
1.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that the wooden posts or pilings

involved in the respondents' encroachment permit applications should be characterized as
"navigational encroachments" for the purpose of processing the subject encroachment permit
applications.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Appellants were

precluded as a matter of law from making the factual determination that the wooden posts or
pilings involved in Respondents' encroachment permit were not "navigational encroachments"
for the purpose of processing the subject encroachment permit applications.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in finding that the filing of a notice of lake

encroachment by the Applicant's predecessor in interest in 1974 resulted in an "acceptance" by
IDL of the structures identified therein as "navigational."
4.

Whether the District Court erred in determining that the subject "pilings"

established the line of navigability in Glengary Bay.
5.

Whether the District Court erred in finding that Appellants' decision to deny the
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Respondents' encroachment permit applications was in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions, in excess of statutory authority of the agency, made upon unlawful procedure, and/or
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
6.

Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Appellants' decisions to deny

the Respondents' encroachment permit applications were arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion.
III.

ARGUMENT.
A.

Standard of Review.

"When the district court acts in its appellate capacity, we review the decision of the
district court to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented on appeal." Lake

CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Department of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 278, 233 P.3d 721, 725
(2010) (quoting Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448,
450 (2009».

This Court "reviews the agency record independently of the district court's

decision." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000) (citations
omitted). Applicants bear the burden of establishing that IDL's actions violated the provisions of
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette

County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998).
"On questions of law the court generally exercises free review, although agencies are
sometimes entitled to deference on questions of statutory construction." Sons & Daughters of

Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n, 144 Idaho 23, 26,156 P.3d 524,527 (2007). If an agency
is entrusted with the administration of a statutory scheme, "the Court may defer to its
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interpretation of the statutes so long as that interpretation is reasonable and not contrary to the
express language of the statute." Id. (citing JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120
Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)).

Construction of statutory language, and the

consideration of whether to give deference to the agency interpretation, ultimately rests with the
judiciary. Id. (citing Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583, 21 P.3d 903, 905 (2001));
Simplot, 120 Idaho at 853-54, 870 P.2d at 1210-11.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), IDL's determination must be affirmed unless its
findings and conclusions are "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion." In conducting judicial review, the "Court does not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). The
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Urrutia,
134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 742. IDL's determinations "are binding on the reviewing court, even
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id. (citation omitted). If IDL's
action is not sustained, it "shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).
B.

The District Court's Interpretation Of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) Is Not
Supported By Rules Of Statutory Construction.

The central issue in the instant appeal concerns the interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-
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1302(h), which provides that the term:
"Encroachments in aid of navigation" means and includes docks, piers,
floats, pilings, breakwaters, boat ramps, channels or basins, and other such aids
to the navigability of the lake, on, in or above the beds or waters of a navigable
lake. The term "encroachments in aid of navigation" may be used interchangeably
herein with the term "navigational encroachments."
(Emphasis added.) Citing section 58-1302(h), the District Court concluded that as a matter of
law, IDL erred in its determination that the "pilings" at issue here are nonnavigational
encroachments:
The flaw in the Department's analysis is that it viewed the issue of
whether the pilings were to be characterized as "nonnavigational
encroachments" or "navigational encroachments" as a factual question rather
than as a "matter oflaw." The fact that the piling are presently unused does
not mean that they will remain unused. No legal authority is presented by the
Department that pilings, by nonuse, cease to be navigational encroachments as
defined by statute.
R., p. 135 (footnote omitted). In short, the District Court's ruling turned on its conclusion that
the legislature, by including "pilings" in the definition of navigable encroachments, intended that
all pilings be deemed navigational regardless of the factual circumstances. This Court recently
held that in construing a statute the Court will "examine the language used, the reasonableness of
the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." Kootenai Hosp. Dist. v. Bonner

Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 149 Idaho 290, 293, 233 PJd 1212, 1215 (2010) (citations omitted),
(quoting St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753,755,
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). The plain meaning of a statute "will prevail unless the clearly
expressed legislative intent is contrary to the plain meaning or unless the plain meaning leads to
absurd results." Id.
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If the legislature does not define a term used in the statute, that term is given its ordinary
dictionary meaning. Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 437, 196 P.3d 352, 355 (2008). "In
determining its ordinary meaning 'effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible,
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.'" State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475,
163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007), (quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309
(2006)).
Additionally, "[l]anguage of a particular section [of a statute] need not be viewed in a
vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine
the legislature's intent." In re WD 170, 148 Idaho 200, 211, 220 P.3d 318, 329 (2009) (quoting
Lockhart v. Dept. ofFish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)).
The District Court's interpretation that all pilings are, as a. matter of law, in aid of
navigation is inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction in three ways.
First, the District Court did not consider the meaning of the word "pilings" (or the
singular "piling" or "pile"). The common meaning applicable to Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) is "a
heavy beam or post driven vertically into the bed of a river, soft ground, etc. to support the
foundations of a superstructure."

New Oxford American Dictionary (2002).

Similarly,

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) (2002) defines a "pile" as a "long,
slender member usu. of timber, steel or reinforced concrete driven into the ground to carry a
vertical load, to resist lateral forces, or to resist water or earth pressure." The term "piling" is
defined by Webster's Third as "1. Pile driving: the formation (as of a foundation) with piles 2: a
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structure of piles 3: logs suitable for or ready to be made into piles.,,6 In short, "pilings" are
wooden posts driven into a lakebed for the specific purpose of carrying vertical loads of a
superstructure into the lakebed.
The record of this case shows that the wood posts at issue have never been used to
support a structure or to constrain vertical or horizontal loads and thus do not meet the definition
of "pilings." Because the wood posts are merely "posts" with no defined purpose, and not
"pilings," they are not encompassed in the scope of items defined as navigational encroachments
in Idaho Code § 58-1302Ch). By statute, all encroachments other than those identified in Idaho
Code § 58-1302Ch) are deemed "nonnavigational." Idaho Code § 58-1302Ci). Thus, the District
Court erroneously equated "posts" as being the equivalent of "pilings."
The second error in the District Court's interpretation results from its interpretation of the
term "pilings" in isolation, ignoring the full context of the definition in which it appears. The
deinition identifies several structures usually associated with navigation and concludes with the
phrase "and other such aids to the navigability of the lake ...." The District Court addressed
this statutory language by stating that "the quoted phrase, when placed in context, is simply a
generic description of what could additionally be an encroachment in aid of navigation." R., p.
135, n.3. This interpretation ignores the word "such." "Such," as used here means "2 a: having
a quality already just specified ... b: of this or that character quality or extent: of the sort or

6 IDL has defmed "piling" the same as the dictionary defmition as "[a] metal, concrete, plastic, or wood
post that is placed into the lakebed and used to secure floating docks and other structures." IDAPA
20.03.04.010.027. The District Court essentially nullified this Rule by reciting that an administrative rule
inconsistent with a statute is ineffective. R., P. 194. IDL's defmition of "piling," however, is consistent with the
dictionary defmition.
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degree previously indicated or implied ... c: previously characterized or specified." Webster's
Third.

Use of the word "such" shows that the preceding phrase is illustrative and not

definitional, i.e. the structures identified in the statute, as well as other structures not specifically
identified, are navigational only if they are "aids to the navigability of the lake." Thus, the
statute recognizes that pilings should be considered navigational encroachments when they are
an aid to the navigability of the lake, such as when used to support docks and piers, but does not
address the status of pilings that are not, in fact, an aid to navigation. The District Court's
interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) renders the qualifying phrase "and other such aids to
the navigability of the lake" meaningless and should be rejected.
A third reason to reject the District Court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) is
that the Court's construction leads to an absurd result. Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 449,
452, 235 P.3d 399, 402 (2010) (the "reasonableness of proposed constructions" should be
considered in determining legislative intent) (quoting Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn,
141 Idaho 388, 398-99, 111 P.3d 73, 83-84 (2005». It is unreasonable to conclude that the
legislature, by including pilings in the illustrative list of navigational encroachments, intended to
deem every piling placed in every lake in Idaho now and in the future to be "navigational"
regardless of its use. For example, pilings are used to support highways and railroad bridges,
such as the Long Bridge and U.S. Highway 95 and BNSF railroad track as they cross Lake Pend
Oreille before reaching Sandpoint.

The District Court's construction of Idaho Code § 58-

-13-

1302(h) reqUIres that these pilings be regulated as "navigational encroachments."7 Such
construction ignores the function and purpose of highway and railroad bridges and is patently
umeasonable. 8 Likewise, a piling with a goose nesting box on top of it, or pilings to support a
heliport in the lake, would be "navigational" under the District Court's interpretation. Pilings
used to constrain a fill in the lake or material placed for shoreline protection would be
navigational even though Idaho Code § 58-1302(i) specifically identifies landfills as
"nonnavigational."
Finally, this Court should read the "navigational" and "nonnavigational" definitions in

pari materia in order to give effect to both definitions. A nonnavigational encroachment is one
"not constructed primarily for use in aid of the navigability of the lake." Idaho Code § 581302(i). By defining all encroachments that are not constructed primarily in aid of navigation to
be nonnavigational, regardless of the nature of the encroachment, the legislature necessarily
intended that the purpose of the encroachment is the primary determinant of whether the
encroachment is to be regulated as navigational or nonnavigational. See DuPont v. Idaho State

Bd of Land Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 618, 625, 7 P.3d 1095, 1102 (2000) (IDL may consider
intended use of a dock in making a determination to revoke an encroachment permit). Thus, the
definition of "nonnavigational" confirms that the list of encroachments included in the definition
of navigational encroachments is illustrative, not definitional.
This Court should give deference to IDL's interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-l302(h) in
7 "navigation" means" 1: the act or practice of navigating 2 a: the science or art of conducting ships or
aircraft from one place to another; esp: the method of determining position, course and distance traveled ... 4: ship
traffic or commerce." Webster's Third.
8 A "bridge" is included in IDL's defmition of"nonnavigational." IDAPA 20.03.04.010.16.
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this case because the elements necessary to establish deference to an agency's interpretation as
set forth in Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219 and Sons & Daughters of Idaho, 144
Idaho at 26,156 P.3d at 527 are present. First, IDL is entrusted with administration of the Idaho
Lake Protection Act. Idaho Code § 58-1301; Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 326-27, 78
P.3d 389, 393-94 (2003). Second, IDL's interpretation is reasonable because it is based upon the
plain meaning of the words in the statute, gives meaning to all the words of the statute, and
interprets the pertinent definitions in pari materia. Third, the statute does not directly address
the precise question at issue. Fourth, three of the five Simplot rationales underlying the rule of
deference are present: (a) with respect to the rationale of repose, IDL has been interpreting and
implementing the statute in this manner for about 38 years and has not been legally questioned
until now; see generally Simplot, ] 20 Idaho at 857-58, 820 P.2d at 1214-1215;

(b) the

interpretation is "practical" given that IDL has applied the statute so as to distinguish between
navigational structures that utilize pilings, and the use of pilings that do not support a
navigational structure; see Simplot, 120 Idaho at 858, 820 P.2d at 1215; (c) IDL has considerable
expertise in administration of the Lake Protection Act in a technical area of the law, as well as
the Public Trust Doctrine; see id., 120 Idaho at 859, 820 P.2d at 1216; Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 32627, 78 P.3d at 393-94; see Brett v. Eleventh Sf. Dockowner's Assoc., Inc., 141 Idaho 517, 521-23,
112 P.3d 805, 809-11 (2005) (deference to agency in resolution of technical issues related to lake
encroachment); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho
622, 632, 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (1983) ("KEA") (Public Trust Doctrine is limitation on IDL
ability to alienate or encumber submerged lands). IDL is aware of the variety of encroachments
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that occur on Idaho lakes, from single-family docks to highway fills and bridges, and is
responsible to ensure that the public interest in Public Trust resources is protected.

IDL's

interpretation is reasonably related to making the important distinction between encroachments
that support navigation, and those not primarily intended to do so, and public involvement in the
encumbrance of a public resource.
The distinction between navigational and nonnavigational encroachments is significant
for the administration of navigable lakes under the LP A because of public ownership and the
public's involvement in the alienation or encumbrance of public resources.

Pursuant to the

Equal Footing Doctrine, the State holds title to the beds ofIdaho's navigable lakes and streams
"for the use and benefit of the whole people ...." Callahan v. Price, 26 Idaho 745, 754, 146 P.
732, 735 (1915). IDL is delegated the authority to regulate and control the use and disposition of
lands beneath navigable waterways.

Idaho Code § 58-104(9).

ID L' s regulations of lake

encroachments is established by the framework of the LP A. The State's jurisdiction to regulate
lake encroachments includes both lands below the natural high water mark and "lands lying
between the natural or ordinary high water mark and the artificial high water mark, if there be
one." Idaho Code § 58-1302(b); see also Burrus v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 34 Idaho 606,
610, 202 P. 1067, 1068 (1921), quoting Pewaukee v. Savoy, 79 N.W. 436 (Wisc. 1899) (when
water level of navigable lake is raised artificially, "the public rights therein are correspondingly
extended so long as such artificial level is maintained").
Lake encroachment permit applications are also evaluated by IDL within the framework
of the Public Trust Doctrine as set forth by this Court in KEA, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 and
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subsequent cases. 9 This Court in KEA cited the 1892 United States Supreme Court case of

Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), for "the principle that a state, as
administrator of the trust in navigable waters on behalf of the public, does not have the power to
abdicate its role as trustees in favor of private parties." KEA, 105 Idaho at 625, 671 P.2d at 1088.
The KEA Court also emphasized that "trusts connected with public property, or property of a
special character, like lands under navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely beyond the
direction and control of the state," and "[t]here can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance
of property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and
manage it." Id 105 Idaho at 626, 671 P.2d at 1089.
In In re Sanders Beach, 134 Idaho 443, 453-54, 147 P.3d 75, 85-86 (2006), this Court
stated:
[w]hen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to relocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties.
(quoting State ex rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 149,594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (1979)).10

9 IDL includes the parameters of the Public Trust Doctrine in its consideration oflake encroachment permit
applications, in addition to the LPA and related Rules. 219B, Ex. 139-140. This is done in part because this Court
has stated that,

it must again be emphasized that mere compliance by these bodies [such as IDL] with their
legislative authority is not sufficient to determine if their actions comport with the requirements
of the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of
permissible government action with respect to public trust resources.
KEA, 105 Idaho at 632,671 P.2d at 1095.
10

Additionally, the Idaho Legislature in 1927 provided that the lands of Lake Pend Oreille between the
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IDL has enacted administrative Rules implementing the LPA. Rule 030.02, IDAPA
20.03.04.030.02 states:
Encroachments not in aid of navigation in navigable lakes will
normally not be approved by the Department and will be considered only
in cases involving major environmental, economic, or social benefits to the
general public. Approval under these circumstances is authorized only when
consistent with the public trust doctrine and when there is no other feasible
alternative with less impact on public trust values.
In this manner, IDL has incorporated into its administrative process the legislative policy set
forth in Idaho Code §§ 58-1301 and 67-4305, the distinction between encroachments in aid of
navigation, and those that are not, as well as the Public Trust Doctrine as articulated by this
Court.
Nonnavigational encroachments are processed with considerably more notice for public
input. Idaho Code § 58-1306(b). This is part because nonnavigational encroachments use a
Public Trust resource for non-Public Trust purposes. IDL has attempted to reflect the legislative
intent of Idaho Code § 58-1301 and the Public Trust Doctrine through the enactment of LPA
Rule 030.02, IDAPA 20.03.04.030.02, which provides that IDL will not approve nonnavigational
encroachments unless some major economic, environmental or social benefit results from the
encroachment (e.g., the new Sandpoint Bypass, which provides economic, social and
environmental benefits even though it is a nonnavigational use).
The District Court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) eliminates this

ordinary high and low water marks "are hereby declared to be devoted to a public use in connection with the
preservation of said lakes in their present condition as a health resort and recreation place for the inhabitants of the
State, ...." Idaho Code § 67-4305.
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navigational/nonnavigational distinction and leads to the absurd result that IDL is precluded from
considering facts pertinent to the administration of Public Trust resources. Pursuant to the Public
Trust Doctrine, IDL must look to the practical outcome of encroachment applications,
particularly ones that commit the public resource to a nonnavigational use that does not further
Public Trust uses.
The irony

III

the District Court's ruling that "pilings" are as a matter of law

"navigational" is that the record shows that the "pilings" at issue in this case have been a
navigational hazard for generations. The benefit to the littoral owners is to deter navigation and
keep the public away from the Applicants' property. The posts inhibit the very purpose of Public
Trust lands.
This court should hold that IDL correctly applied Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) to the facts of
the case and correctly characterized the subject pilings as "nonnavigational" with respect to both
applications 291B and 219C.
C.

The Filing Of A Notice Of Encroachment By Doug McLean In 1974 Does Not
Operate As An "Acceptance" By IDL Of The Subject "Piling" As A
Navigational Encroachment.

In its Decision on Rehearing, the District Court examined the "Notice of Encroachment"
filed by Douglas McLean (219B Ex. 085-087), predecessor in interest to the Applicants. The
Court found that this Notice indicated that the pilings were there for the purpose of a "boat
moorage area." R., p. 192. The Court further concluded that,
[t]he Department accepted the Notice of Encroachment and took no action
to abate the encroachment or seek removal of the pilings during the last 34
years. Now, once the Kaseburgs have made their request approximately 35
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years later, the Department takes the position that the pilings it previously
accepted as encroachments are, in fact, not really pilings.
R., id Contrary to the conclusion of the District Court, the filing of Mr. McLean's Notice of
Encroachment in 1974 does not bind IDL, or result in a factual determination as a matter of law
that the pilings are "navigational."
The McLean "Notice of Encroachment" was filed in 1974 pursuant to what was
originally codified as Idaho Code § 58-153, later redesignated as Idaho Code § 58-1312. Until
2006, this provision stated as follows:
On or before December 31, 1974, every person owning or possessing
an existing navigational or nonnavigational encroachment on, in or above the
beds or waters of a navigable lake in this state shall file with the board notification
thereof. Such notice shall be upon forms to be furnished by the board and contain
such information concerning the encroachment as would be necessary on plans
submitted with an original application under the provisions of this act.
The plain reading of this statute shows that filing of the "Notice of Encroachment" is
nothing more than that - filing of a Notice of a claim that the encroachment existed before the
enactment of the Lake Protection Act. The filing of a claim does not equate to an adjudication of
the claim.

There was nothing for IDL to "accept," and IDL made no investigations or

determinations as to whether the claimed encroachments were in fact navigational or
nonnavigational, and did not verify the described purposes or uses of such encroachments. As
such, the Notices filed under the terms of what is now codified as Idaho Code § 58-1312 have no
legal consequence other than making a record of the claimed existence of an encroachment as of
1974.
Not until the 219B application was published and comments received from the adjacent
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littoral neighbors and other residents of Glengary Bay was the issue. of prior use considered by
IDL. It is in response to these public comments that IDL investigated the actual use of the
pilings, their impact on the adjacent littoral property owners and public navigation in general.
Finally, the District Court erred when it concluded that Mr. McLean indicated that the
pilings are there for the purpose of a "boat moorage area." R., p. 192; 219B, Ex. 086 and 087.
The Notice filed by Mr. McLean included not only the "pilings," but a separate "dock and tree."
219B, Ex. 086. The purpose of the encroachment was identified as "Private swimming & boat
moorage area; & private water source." 219B, Ex. 087. The accompanying map shows a "dock"
used to "moor small boats" located on the shoreline at the summer pool separate from the
pilings, but no navigational use near the pilings. There is no evidence in the record that the
pilings were ever used for mooring boats. Indeed, pilings, standing alone, are impractical for
boat moorage because the boat will swing around with the wind and waves, and the passengers
would need to disembark from the boat in at least several feet of water. 219B, Ex. 140 at 1 7.
Additionally, use of the pilings for boat moorage would be inconsistent with the fact that Mr.
McLean had a dock close to shore. One commentor, Mark Nelson, who knew the McLean
family, said Mr. McLean had told him that his submittal in the 1970's involved using the piling
to support the water intake system. 219B, Ex. 060. Finally, commentors noted that the pilings
were used for a destination for swimming, which makes sense since the pilings would deter boats
from entering that area and it would be safer for swimmers, consistent with Mr. McLean's
designation of the area's use for "private swimming." 219B, Ex. 059.
The McLean Notice of Encroachment in 1974 has no legal effect on this Court's
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consideration of this case, and does not support a finding that IDL "accepted" Mr. McLean's
identification of the subject pilings as navigational and as part of a "boat moorage area." At
most, the Notice provides notice of existing structures in the area in question in 1974 - nothing
more.
D.

The Subject "Pilings" Do Not Establish The Line Of Navigability In
Glengary Bay.

The District Court remanded the case to IDL "to determine the line of navigability and to
consider the Kaseburgs' littoral rights in conjunction with the legislature's definition that the
pilings at issue are 'encroachments in aid of navigation. '" R., p. 136.
As explained in Section B of this Argument, supra, the District Court erred in concluding
that the statutory definition of navigational encroachments compels the conclusion that the
subject pilings were erected in aid of navigation. Thus, the pilings do not provide any evidence
as to the line of navigability in Glengary Bay, and IDL should not be required to consider these
pilings as relevant to the line of navigability. IDL respectfully requests this Court to uphold
IDL's decision to not consider the pilings as evidence of the line of navigability.
Additionally, the District Court's directive "to determine the line of navigability" ignored
the record of this case, which shows that IDL has already established the line of navigability in
the area in question at being 55 feet waterward of the artificial high water mark. 219C, Ex. 050.
IDL further explained that "all other single family docks for miles up and down the shoreline are
typically no more than fifty five feet (55') into the lake." 219C, Ex. 051. The existing line of
navigability was also referenced by comrnentors in the record. 219C, Ex. 038, 041, 045-046.
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The District Court is bound to defer to the agency's factual determinations if they are supported
by competent evidence in the record. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 742.

IV.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the foregoing reasons and authorities, IDL respectfully requests this Court to

vacate the District Court's rulings on this matter, and to remand the matter to the District Court
with direction to enter judgment affirming IDL's denial of lake encroachment permit
applications 219B and 219C.
DATED this

IO~ay of May 2012.
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